Conceptual knowledge is acquired through recurrent experiences, by extracting statistical regularities at different levels of granularity. At a fine level, patterns of feature co-occurrence are categorized into objects. At a coarser level, patterns of concept co-occurrence are categorized into contexts. We present and test CONCAT, a connectionist model that simultaneously learns to categorize objects and contexts. The model contains two hierarchically organized CALM modules (Murre, Phaf, & Wolters, 1992). The first module, the Object Module, forms object representations based on co-occurrences (...) between features. These representations are used as input for the second module, the Context Module, which categorizes contexts based on object co-occurrences. Feedback connections from the Context Module to the Object Module send activation from the active context to those objects that frequently occur within this context. We demonstrate that context feedback contributes to the successful categorization of objects, especially when bottom-up feature information is degraded or ambiguous. (shrink)

A previous study has shown that the degree of trust into others might be biased by inducing either a more “inclusive” or “exclusive” cognitive-control mode. Here, we investigated whether the degree of interpersonal trust can be biased by environmental factors, such as odors, that are likely to impact cognitive-control states. Arousing olfactory fragrances (e.g., peppermint) are supposed to induce a more exclusive, and calming olfactory fragrances (e.g., lavender) a more inclusive state. Participants performed the Trust Game, which provides an index (...) of interpersonal trust by assessing the money units one participant (the trustor) transfers to another participant (the trustee), while being exposed to either peppermint or lavender aroma. All participants played the role of trustor. As expected, participants transferred significantly more money to the alleged trustee in the lavender as compared to the peppermint and no aroma conditions. This observation might have various serious implications for a broad range of situations in which interpersonal trust is an essential element, such as cooperation (e.g., mixed-motives situations), bargaining and negotiation, consumer behavior, and group performance. (shrink)

Family carers of individual’s living with Huntington’s Disease (HD) manage a distinct and unique series of difficulties arising from the complex nature of HD. This paper presents the validation of the definitive measure of quality of life for this group. The Huntington’s Disease Quality of Life Battery for carers (HDQoL-C) was expanded and then administered to an international sample of 1716 partners and family carers from 13 countries. In terms of the psychometric properties of the tool, exploratory analysis of half (...) of the sample, demonstrated good internal consistency and reliability. Some items on the full version did not meet psychometric thresholds and a short version (HDQoL-Cs) was developed based on more stringent criteria. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the model structure showed a good fit for all Factors and, indicated that the HDQoL-C and HDQoL-Cs are psychometrically robust measures of quality of life. We found that carers who lived with and looked after their spouse/partner had reduced sense of coping, hope for the future and overall quality of life. Carers with children who were at risk, carried the gene or were symptomatic also had poorer quality of life outcomes. Findings indicated the HDQoL-C and HDQoL-Cs are valid in multiple languages and across varied cultures as measures of self-reported quality of life in family carers of individual’s living with HD. These psychometrically validated tools can aid and guide the implementation of therapeutic interventions to improve life quality in this population. (shrink)

"Bernard Groethuysen (1880-1946), philosophe d'origine allemande, partage, dès 1904, sa vie entre Berlin et Paris où il étudie la Révolution française et rencontre, grâce à Bergson, Alix Guillain (1876-1951), traductrice et journaliste à L'Humanité. Vivant avec leurs compagnes dans le phalanstère de la rue Campagne-Première, Groethuysen et Paulhan, devenus amis, oeuvrent à partir de 1920 à La Nouvelle Revue francaise, dont ce dernier prend la direction cinq ans plus tard : ils font découvrir Hôlderlin, Kassner, Kafka, Büchner, Musil... En 1927, (...) ils inaugurent leur collection "Bibliothèque des Idées" par l'essai majeur de Groethuysen, Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France, "notre premier enfant", écrit-il à Paulhan. Dans son ultime lettre d'Allemagne, de 1931, il s'inquiète : "L'Histoire devrait nous donner des vacances. On en profiterait pour reprendre la vie." En août 1932, devant l'essor du nazisme, Groethuysen s'exile en France. Quant à Paulhan, le Front populaire le voit s'engager aux côtés de Jean Longuet, maire socialiste de Châtenay-Malabry. Arrive la guerre : Germaine et Jean Paulhan quittent leur maison, leur jardin, leurs animaux, dont Alix Guillain et Groethuysen, naturalisé en 1938, prennent soin. Après la défaite de l'Allemagne, le philosophe rêve encore d'utopie, mais il meurt le 17 septembre 1946. Les travaux de Groethuysen m'intéressaient, il s'intéressait aux miens", confiera Paulhan à Ponge. Ce volume prouve leur affectueuse amitié, fondée sur le travail en commun pour la NRF. Mais c'est également un document sur les réseaux intellectuels et politiques de l'entre-deux-guerres: Maria Van Rysselberghe et les amis de Gide, la princesse de Bassiano et la revue Commerce, Paul Desjardins et les Décades de Pontigny, Henry Church et la revue Mesures, Alix Guillain et le Parti communiste, Aline Mayrisch et le groupe de Colpach... "Je n'ai pas connu d'autre homme, écrira Paulhan, pour qui une idée, fût-elle évidemment fausse ou absurde, dès l'instant qu'un homme l'avait inventée, eût un tel prix. Il disait: "C'est une idée" d'un ton de gourmet. C'est qu'il pensait que la vérité ayant été une fois dans la suite des temps atteinte (par Hegel et - pour ce qui concernait son application au monde moderne - par Marx), il ne nous restait qu'à former des idées - plus ou moins agréables, curieuses, attendrissantes de faiblesse." (Mort de Groethuysen à Luxembourg, rédigé en 1946)."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book proves to be an excellent guide through the labyrinth of law. Its crucial point is legal order viewed from the perspective of a situated "We". Jurisprudence appears as an implicit sort of thinking, embedded in moral, political, epistemological, and linguistic contexts. Numerous example cases lead us from everyday issues to the abysses of violence. Anyone who practices or studies law will highly profit from reading this book. One sees how law functions by being more than mere law. (...) class='Hi'>Bernhard Waldenfels, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany Legal Thought and Philosophy clarifies background questions in legal research projects, such as the relationship between law and justice, law and politics, law and knowledge, facts and norms, normativity and validity, constituent and constitutional power, and rule and context. It provides advanced students in law and philosophy with an account of legal thinking that combines analytical and phenomenological insights. From a conception of justice as principled political self-restraint, the book explains why there are moral reasons to separate law from morality conceptually and in what sense a legal order is positive--that is, set by authority and bound up with history. The book explores the conditions under which law may become an object of knowledge and theorising, before finally discussing how these features come together in law as rule-following by citizens, officials, judges, and legislators alike. Addressing advanced students in law and philosophy, this key book: bridges separate traditions in legal philosophy (in particular analytical philosophy and phenomenology), develops a view of law as an institution of authority from a conception of justice in the socio-political relationship between we and the others, presents a systematic account of normativity and validity, explains in what sense law is doing things with rules. (shrink)

Das Thema Leib ist langst nicht mehr nur auf die traditionelle phanomenologische Forschung beschrankt. Das leibliche Sein betrifft vielmehr die Situation des Menschen an sich. Die Anthropologie des 20. Jh. bedarf angesichts der Ergebnisse der Ethologie, der Genomforschung und der Neurowissenschaften einer Revision. Die hier formulierte Version einer empirisch orientierten transklassischen Phanomenologie thematisiert den menschlichen Leib philosophisch neu und begrundet so eine leiborientierte Anthropologie fur das 21. Jahrhundert. Kern dieser Anthropologie ist nicht eine biologische Definition, sondern das leibliche In-der-Welt-Sein des (...) Menschen. Dieses leibliche Sein definiert sich durch die Fahigkeit, mit sich selbst, mit anderen und mit der Natur angemessen umgehen zu konnen. (shrink)

Wiederkehr des Raumes?. Topologisches Paradigmen ; Rückkehr zum gelebten Raum ; Raumkonzepte und Raumpraktiken ; Regionale oder fundamentale Räumlichkeit ; Zweideutigkeiten und Paradoxien der Lebenswelt -- Polarität von Ort und Raum. Phänomenologische Topik ; Wo-Frage im Schatten der Was-Frage ; Ortsbestimmung als Antwort auf eine Wo-Frage ; Fremde und eigene Wo-Frage ; Hier als Standort : Grund und Boden ; Woher und Wohin : Wegstrecken ; Worin : offene und geschlossene Räume ; Ringsum : Umgebung, Umwelt und Welt ; Wie (...) weit : Vermessene Räume -- Leibliches Wohnen im Raum. Vielfalt des Raumes ; Verankerung im Hier ; Raumachsen ; Durchmessung, Dehnung und Schrumpfung des Raumes ; Nähe und Ferne ; Drinnen und Draußen ; Interieur und Exterieur im Blickfield der Malerei ; Raumanlage und Raumbühne ; Raumtechniken und Ortskarten ; Lokale Räume und globaler Raum -- Ortsverschiebungen. Hier und Anderswo ; Aktualität, Habitualität und Virtualität der räumlichen Bewegung ; Spuren der Zeit im Raum ; Zersprengter Raum ; Telepräsenz ; Fremdorte und andere Räume ; Gemeinorte und globaler Raum ; Gastlichkeit ; Coda : Topos : Atopie : Heterotopien -- Zeitverdoppelung und Zeitverschiebung. Zwischen Mythos und Logos ; Frage nach der Zeit ; Zeitverdoppelung in der Rede und Zeitverkörperung ; Zeitverschiebung zwischen Pathos und Respons ; Zeitverschiebung und Reaktionszeit ; Der entrückte Anfang im Roman und auf der Bühne ; Zeit der Sinne ; Jenseits von Erinnerung und Erwartung ; Rhythmen und Tempi ; Zwischen Leere und Erfüllung ; Coda : Anderswo enden -- Die verändernde Kraft der Wiederholung. Wiederholungsexperiment ; Sich wiederholdende Erfahrung ; Widerholung als Rettung aus der Zeit ; Altes und Neues im Widerstreit ; Unwiederholbares in der Zeit -- Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Zukünftigem im Anschluß an Aristoteles. Handlungsperspektive ; Die drohende Seeschlacht ; Wahrscheinlichkeit und Häufigkeit ; Zwischen Gewißheit und Ungewißheit ; Rückzug auf pratische Gewißheit ; Zwischen Entwurf und Erwartung ; Unwahrscheinliche Zukunft -- Kommen und Gehen in der Zeit im Anschluß an Merleau-Ponty. Frühe dialektik der Zeit ; Zeit als bloßes Nacheinander ; Totalität der Zeit : Präsenzfeld ; Riß der Zeit : Selbstaffektion ; Bewegung der Zeit : Vor- und Rückläufigkeit ; Wahrnehmung zwischen Vor- und Rückblick ; Handeln zwischen Vorsatz und Vorschlag ; Kommen und Gehen ; Chiasmus der Zeit -- Epilog : Verquickung von Ort, Raum und Zeit. (shrink)

An ethical epoché is required to leave the terrain of a self-evident morality and question its origin. In particular, four fundamental motifs of the ethical dimension are identified: pathos, to be thematised as an alternative to the persistent activist unilateralism; response, which always involves body and soul; diastasis with its stumbles and subtractions; and finally coaffection, in which the social dimension of experience is announced. Ethical behaviour feeds on the magma of pathos, which in turn would be blind and directionless (...) without any ethos. (shrink)

Living corporeity is the intermediate element between nature and culture, which must be thought of as a reciprocal interconnection, since as corporeal beings we always move on a threshold. In the reflection of the bodily self, a doubling between the living body as a functioning subject and as a material object is revealed; after all, even one's own body sometimes takes on the features of a foreign body, as is the case in the experience of illness. In the technical instrument, (...) the body is prolonged and this highlights the connection between the technique of the thing and the technique of the self; however, despite the gradual autonomisation of the technical element from the living corporeity, there remains what escapes calculation and looms large in the subtraction of the alien. (shrink)

Bernhard Nickel presents a theory of generic sentences and the kind-directed modes of thought they express. The theory closely integrates compositional semantics with metaphysics to solve the problem that generics pose: what do generics mean? Generic sentences are extremely simple, yet if there are patterns to be discerned in terms of which are true and which are false, these patterns are subtle and complex. Ravens are black, and lions have manes: statistical measures cannot do justice to the facts, but (...) what else is there that has a hope of giving us insight into what we are capturing across so many domains? Nickel argues that generics are the top of a fundamentally explanatory iceberg, and that this explanatory framework is deeply intertwined with the semantics of the language we use to express them. In providing an integrated semantic and metaphysical theory of generics, he aims to solve old puzzles and draw attention to new phenomena. (shrink)

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...) that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail. (shrink)

This volume introduces a model of the human physical mind that puts the concept of competence at the center of its analysis, constructing a post-positivistic, postmodern and post-analytic philosophy of the human mind that combines empirical-instrumental phenomenology and neo-hermeneutics. German text. Contents: Die Neurowissenschaften: Topographie des menschlichen Gehirns und die Architektur des menschlich-leiblichen Geistes - Cognitive Science: Unterschiede maschineller und menschlicher Intelligenz - Explizite psychisch-geistige Kompetenzen: Erfahrung, Erinnerung,Wissen, Bewusstsein - Freiheit, Handlungskompetenz und Selbsterkenntnis: leiblicher Geist und menschliche Personlichkeit.

This volume documents for the first time the enormous variety of diverging interpretations and presents a text-oriented analysis of antinomy and its resolution ...

I contrast two approaches to the interpretation of generics such as ‘ravens are black:’ majority-based views, on which they are about what is the case most of the time, and inquiry-based views, on which they are about a feature we focus on in inquiry. I argue that majority-based views face far more systematic counterexamples than has previously been supposed. They cannot account for generics about kinds with multiple characteristic properties, such as ‘elephants live in Africa and Asia.’ I then go (...) on to sketch an inquiry-based view. (shrink)

Few would contest the fact that analytical philosophy has dominated philosophical practice in the English speaking world for about the last century. But dispute continues about both its origins and nature; whilst others question its value. Michael Dummett wholly embraced the analytical approach to philosophy, as he conceived of it. For him analytical philosophy marked itself off from its precursors and its alternatives, embodied in the Continental tradition, by taking the linguistic turn. And Frege was unequivocally the first philosopher to (...) take that auspicious turn, which ushered in a new method in philosophy. Henceforth philosophers were to approach the business of analyzing thought via the enterprise of analyzing language. So Dummett is presenting us with both a history lesson and a recommendation about how we ought to do philosophy. But is his reading of the history accurate? And is his conception of the nature of analytical philosophy viable? In order to reflect on these questions this collection brings together eight scholars who have made a serious business of reading Dummett. (shrink)

Gödel once offered an argument for the general reflection principle in set theory that took the form of an analogy with Leibniz' Monadology. I discuss the mathematical and philosophical background to Gödel's argument, reconstruct the proposed analogy in detail, and argue that it has no justificatory force.

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account (...) for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data. Key Words: action planning; binding; common coding; event coding; feature integration; perception; perception-action interface. (shrink)

Bernard Williams argued that historical and philosophical inquiry were importantly linked in a number of ways. This introductory chapter distinguishes four different connections he identified between philosophy and history. (1) He believed that philosophy could not ignore its own history in the way that science can. (2) He thought that when engaging with philosophy’s history primarily to produce history, one still had to draw on philosophy. (3) Even doing history of philosophy philosophically, i.e. primarily to produce philosophy, required a keen (...) sense of how historically distant from us past philosophers were, on his view, because the point of reading them was to confront something different from the present. (4) He held that systematic philosophy itself needed to be done historically, engaging not necessarily with its own history, but with that of the concepts it sought to understand. The chapter closes with an overview of the volume’s structure and content. (shrink)

Die Rede von einem Zwischenreich des Dialogs deutet hin auf den intermedHi. ren Charakter des Dialogs, in dem zwischen uns zustande kommt, was keiner fur sich zustande brachte. Stehen wir immer schon im Dialog, so ist fur jeden der Weg zu sich selbst nicht der kurzeste, sondern der langste, er ginge durch die Welt sowohl wie durch die Andern. Dieser Gesichtspunkt ist keines wegs selbstverstandlich, doch selbst dort, wo er sich Geltung ver schafft, wird er vielfach verdunkelt durch die Verwandlung (...) von Verschiedenem in Gegensatzliches, wenn etwa interpersonale Be ziehung und soziale Verhaltnisse, interpersonales Ereignis und anonyme Prozesse und Strukturen, personliche Umkehr und so ziale Veranderungen gegeneinander ausgespielt werden. N eigt die sogenannte Philosophie des Dialogs dazu, reine zwischenmensch liche Beziehungen abzulosen von der mundanen und sozialen Wirklichkeit, so tendiert ein Denken, das von Geschichte und Gesellschaft ausgeht, dahin, einzig den konkreten Entwicklungs gang einer Menschheit in Rechnung zu stellen. Der wechselseitig erhobene Vorwurf, man verliere sich hierin der AuBerlichkeit des Offentlichen und der bloBen Geschichte, man fluchte sich dort in die Innerlichkeit des Privaten und des bloBen Augenblicks, ware dann nur der Ausdruck dafur, daB entweder das Ganze ohne das Urspriingliche oder das Ursprungliche ohne das Ganze gesucht wird. Was hier auseinanderstrebt, nicht nur in der Theorie, sondern auch in der Lebenspraxis, sind zwei Weisen des mitmenschlichen Umgangs. (shrink)

While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices (...) at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education. (shrink)

The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get (...) stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ‘Cartesian’ preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. (shrink)

Ceteris Paribus (cp-)laws may be said to hold only “other things equal,” signaling that their truth is compatible with a range of exceptions. This paper provides a new semantic account for some of the sentences used to state cp-laws. Its core approach is to relate these laws to natural language on the one hand — by arguing that cp-laws are most naturally expressed with generics — and to natural kinds on the other — by arguing that the semantics of generics (...) in the context of the special sciences are best spelled out by appeal to natural kinds. The paper then goes on to draw on these semantics in order to illuminate several problems raised by cp-laws, some familiar, some new. (shrink)